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BRENNAN AND BREWBAKER’S CHRISTIAN 
LEGAL THOUGHT:  PROVIDING THE 
FOUNDATIONS FOR ESTABLISHMENT 
CLAUSE UNDERSTANDING 
ANGELA C. CARMELLA† 
INTRODUCTION 
Catholic and Evangelical Protestant institutions have very 
little use for the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  
Of course, they appreciate the clause when it bolsters the Free 
Exercise Clause to limit government entanglement in church 
institutions, to protect church autonomy, and to prohibit 
preference of one religion over another.1  But they tend to reject 
the notion that the Establishment Clause plays a role in limiting 
religious exercise.  As to government messages and government 
money, these Christian communities take a decidedly narrow 
view of the clause.2  They favor civic acknowledgement of the 
nation’s Judeo-Christian heritage as well as financial support for 
church schools and other religious institutions.  On issues of 
exemptions, they take a broad view of the free exercise right of 
Christians to be exempt from laws inconsistent with their 
teachings, whether individual or communal, nonprofit or for-
profit; and they reject the notion that disruptions or burdens to 
third parties resulting from exemptions implicate the 
Establishment Clause.3 
 
† Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law 
1 See generally Angela C. Carmella, Catholic Institutions in Court: The Religion 
Clauses and Political-Legal Compromise, 120 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (2017). 
2 See generally Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: 
Santa Fe, Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 771 (2001). 
3 The Supreme Court has been asked to grant or uphold exemptions to religious 
institutions in a number of cases. See, e.g., Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012); Cutter v. 
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); 
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Under this approach—which clearly prioritizes the 
protection of religious exercise as well as the religious messages 
of cultural and political institutions—it appears that the 
Establishment Clause plays little or no role independent of the 
Free Exercise Clause.  My question, then, is whether Christian 
legal thought compels us, or at least supports, such a reading of 
the Establishment Clause.  In other words, does this lack of 
concern for non-establishment norms inhere in Christian legal 
and political thought?  I look to Patrick Brennan and William 
Brewbaker’s casebook—Christian Legal Thought: Materials and 
Cases (“CLT”)4—in search of a framework for exploration.  And I 
am not disappointed.  The book provides a treasure of excerpts, 
commentary, and questions that can enlighten our 
understanding of Christian perspectives on Establishment 
Clause interpretation and on notions of non-establishment more 
generally.  While only a small part of the book explicitly 
addresses modern notions of “church and state” and 
establishment,5 CLT provides a comprehensive review of each of 
the major traditions within Christianity (Catholic, Lutheran, 
Anabaptist, Calvinist, and Reformed) and develops multiple, 
interconnected concepts—the nature of church, society, state, 
authority, culture, and the purpose of law—all of which are 
implicated in Establishment Clause interpretation.  In some 
senses, the entire book helps us explore the question I pose.  But 
I refer more specifically to those concepts that inform our 
understanding in the specific American legal context.  Indeed, 
CLT shows us how integral Christian concepts are to the way we 
think and speak about law, and the way we are politically and 
socially organized.  It implicitly criticizes the task of some 
Establishment Clause interpretations to “separate out” what is 
religious.  On the other hand, it recognizes the modern conditions 
and challenges of religious pluralism within a secular state.  CLT 
provides students and scholars with the intellectual resources to 
consider the meaning of non-establishment in a holistic and 
nuanced way.6 
 
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985). 
4 PATRICK MCKINLEY BRENNAN & WILLIAM S. BREWBAKER III, CHRISTIAN 
LEGAL THOUGHT: MATERIALS AND CASES (2017) [hereinafter CLT]. 
5 Id. at 467–97. 
6 One caveat to the reader: my deep interest in Catholicism has meant that my 
attention has been drawn primarily to Catholic materials within the book. 
MACRO_CARMELLA 8/14/2018  9:07 PM 
2017] ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE UNDERSTANDING 41 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S USE OF CHURCH-STATE HISTORY FOR 
INTERPRETING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
Before describing the contribution of CLT to understanding 
the Establishment Clause, I would like to set out some relevant 
considerations of current Establishment Clause interpretation.  
Political and lawmaking authority come through the “state” in 
liberalism.  The clause focuses on the secularity of the state, both 
as to the nature of the political and legal acts it may take and as 
a way of distinguishing itself from the religious nature of 
churches.  In relation to religious people and institutions, the 
state can protect religious exercise as a civil right.  The state is 
distinct from religious communities and, while it can relate to 
them, cannot delegate governmental powers to them and cannot 
interfere with or usurp their religious functions or decisions.  It 
can give benefits to religious institutions as long as those benefits 
are not distributed on religious criteria and are the result of 
private decision, and it can recognize the secular aspects of 
religious symbols and celebrations.  The state cannot influence 
private religious decisions and cannot itself make religious 
decisions.  It cannot endorse or disapprove of religion by making 
religion relevant to a citizen’s standing in the political 
community.  It cannot coerce religious observance, even if no 
legal penalty is involved. 
It is true that in the past the Establishment Clause has been 
interpreted both more narrowly (to forbid fewer forms of 
government support to religion, as in the pre-1947 period) and 
more broadly (to forbid many more forms of government support 
to religion, as in the era of the heightened Lemon test7).  But 
there has been a consistent understanding that state and church 
should not be confused or conflated, that institutional boundaries 
should be respected, and that symbolic government-religion 
relationships should be ordered toward civic as opposed to 
confessional ends. 
To reinforce the state’s secularity, the Supreme Court has on 
occasion given historical context to the Establishment Clause.  In 
its early modern jurisprudence, starting with Everson v. Board of 
Education in 1947, the Court appeared to be answering the 
question of whether the clause was designed to protect non-
preferential assistance to various churches, or whether it was 
 
7 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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designed to bar all assistance to churches.8  It first answered 
with an absolutist historical account, justifying a separationist 
prohibition on assistance to any and all religion.9  In this account, 
Madison and Jefferson, as authoritative interpreters of the First 
Amendment, are staunch supporters of the separation of church 
and state; the Virginia disestablishment experience becomes 
normative for interpreting the clause.  Madison’s Memorial and 
Remonstrance makes a theological case for leaving Christianity 
alone on the grounds that to fund it is to destroy it.10  This 
pietistic separationism (going hand-in-hand with enlightenment 
separationism) is both described and criticized in CLT.  The book 
discusses both the Baptist rejection of government support of 
Christianity (and the emphasis on soul liberty)11 and the 
conservative critics who think these Christians were misguided 
and indeed duped by secular separationists.12 
To counter this historical narrative, Catholics (and later 
Evangelical Protestants) offered an accommodationist account, 
pointing to the many cooperative church-state relationships and 
pervasive Christian symbols and practices in the founding period 
and embracing Washington and others who thought the support 
of religion and morality was critical to developing the virtuous 
citizenry necessary to self-government.13  Jesuit theologian and 
public philosopher John Courtney Murray, S.J. rejected the 
separationist narrative as one that embraced a Madisonian 
 
8 See generally Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
9 See id. at 11–16; see also Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 
203, 217 (1948); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 428–30 (1962); Abington Sch. Dist. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214 (1963) (citing Everson and declaring “the views of 
Madison and Jefferson . . . came to be incorporated not only in the Federal 
Constitution but likewise in those of most of our States”). 
10 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 
¶ 6 (1785). 
11 Timothy L. Hall, “Incendiaries of Commonwealths”: Baptists and Law, in 
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 340–53 (Michael W. McConnell et al. 
eds., 2001), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 276–78. 
12 OLIVER O’DONOVAN, DESIRE OF THE NATIONS: REDISCOVERING THE ROOTS OF 
POLITICAL THEOLOGY 244, 246–47, 249 (1996), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 
471–72. 
13 See, e.g., ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1950); CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, ARTHUR T. DOWNEY & EDWARD C. ROBERTS, 
FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT: FORMATION AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES (1964) (scholarship regarding the non-
preferential accommodation of religion in the founding period). 
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theology—one of privatized religion.14  The religion clauses were 
“articles of peace,” not “of faith,” he contended.15  The 
accommodationist narrative that he and other Catholics helped 
to craft was consistently presented to the Supreme Court; it 
made its way into several opinions,16 and pieces of it have been 
influential in various cases.  CLT helps us to understand why 
Catholics would be adamant about state accommodation of 
religion, given the Church’s long theological understanding of 
law as the province of both church and state, and particularly the 
interconnectedness of divine, natural, and human law. 
The separationist and accommodationist narratives, as used 
by the Supreme Court, provide justification for their decisions; 
and though they glean some significant theological and 
philosophical ideas of the founding period, they give us a rather 
thin conception of the nature of non-establishment.  In the last 
thirty years the Court has rarely noted historical or intellectual 
foundations at all.  These histories give us a sense of separate 
jurisdictions and the need for care in the church-state 
relationship, but the fact that they are employed inconsistently 
and primarily to justify a particular outcome leaves us in search 
of a principle.  Up until now, the principle has been defined in a 
variety of ways: psychological tests concerning “endorsement”17 
and “coercion,”18 wildly varied applications of Lemon, vague 
notions of neutrality,19 concern over judicial legitimacy,20 and 
formalism.21  Can we do better?  Yes.  We can try to retrieve some 
Christian legal concepts to get a more expansive understanding 
of the nature of political authority and law.  If the Establishment 
Clause is about the secularity of politics and law and the  
 
 
14 Frederick G. Lawrence, John Courtney Murray and the Ambiguities of 
Liberalism, in JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY & THE GROWTH OF TRADITION 41, 50–51 
(Leon Hooper, S.J. & Todd David Whitmore eds., 1996), as reprinted in CLT, supra 
note 4, at 491–92. 
15 JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC 
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 68 (2005). 
16 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673–78 (1984); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 
38, 98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
17 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687, 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
18 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 585, 592 (1992). 
19 Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1842–43 (2014) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
20 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
21 Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 714–15 (2010). 
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flourishing of pluralism, then CLT can help us understand the 
Christian roots of modern secularity as well as the Christian 
engagement with pluralism.22 
II. THE MEDIEVAL CHURCH AS STATE WITH POLITICAL AND 
LAWMAKING AUTHORITY 
Christianity, unlike Judaism and Islam, does not have a 
revealed legal code for living in society.  Christianity became 
institutionalized as a legal and political system through the 
repeated controversies between popes and kings, in which they 
competed for power and jurisdiction.  CLT provides excellent 
historical background to illustrate these developments.  Pope 
Gelasius, in the fifth century, noted the spiritual and temporal 
jurisdictions, and claimed for the Church “genuine ruling 
authority . . . on at least a par with that exercised by the state.”23  
And in the Papal Revolution of the 11th and 12th centuries, the 
Church took on a corporate legal existence and claimed 
independence on ecclesiastical and some political matters.24  As 
the excerpts from Harold Berman’s work in CLT make clear, the 
Papal Revolution not only forged the “freedom of the Church” but 
gave birth to the modern state of the West—with the Church 
itself the first state.25  As a state, the Church through law sought 
to “reform the world in order to save souls.”26  As a law-making 
and law-enforcing authority, it competed with the secular 
authorities for power and “claimed a right to exercise coercive 
jurisdiction through law.”27  In this way, Christianity became 
institutionalized through law.28  Later, during the Protestant 
Reformation and the rise of various theories that reinforced the 
notion of distinct jurisdictions (for example, Luther’s Two 
Kingdoms, Calvin’s Spiritual and Civil Government), “spiritual 
authority and spiritual responsibilities” were transferred to 
 
22 See infra Part III. 
23 CLT, supra note 4, at 475 (discussing Letter from Pope Gelasius I to Emperor 
Anastasius (494)). 
24 Id. at 222. 
25 HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN 
LEGAL TRADITION 113 (1983), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 223. 
26 Id. at 222 (casebook authors summarizing Berman’s account). 
27 Id. at 223. 
28 Id. at 222. 
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secular leaders.29  Sometimes church and state had separate 
jurisdictions; on some matters, they shared concurrent 
jurisdiction.  But the “dualism of spiritual and secular 
jurisdictions” persisted.30  As Berman notes: 
The idea of the secular state, which was implicit in the Papal 
Revolution from its inception, and the reality of the secular 
state, which emerged out of the historical struggle between 
ecclesiastical and secular forces that constituted the Papal 
Revolution, were in essence the idea and the reality of a state 
ruled by law . . . . This meant, first, that the respective heads of 
each body, the ecclesiastical and the secular, would introduce 
and maintain their own legal systems. . . . Second, it meant that 
the respective heads of each department would be bound by the 
law which they themselves had enacted . . . . It meant, third, 
that each jurisdiction would also be lawful; each state existed 
within a system of plural jurisdictions. . . . If the church was to 
have inviolable legal rights, the state had to accept those rights 
as a lawful limitation upon its own supremacy. Similarly, the 
rights of the state constituted a lawful limitation upon the 
supremacy of the church. The two powers could only coexist 
peacefully through a shared recognition of the rule of law, its 
supremacy over each.31 
Thus, even without revealed law within the Christian Scriptures 
or tradition, the Church came to be fully entrenched in a legal 
system.  Thomas Aquinas, 13th century theologian, philosopher, 
and jurist, has been immensely influential in framing a Christian 
theory of law.  His works figure prominently in CLT. 
Aquinas grounds law in reason.  He notes that the 
providence of God orders all things to their ends, so that nothing 
is irrational; there is divine order in all creation.32  This divine 
governance then takes the form of law, “eternal, divine, natural, 
and human.”33  As Pope Benedict XVI has noted, “nature and  
 
 
29 HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II: THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT 
REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (2003), as reprinted in CLT, 
supra note 4, at 224. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 227. 
32 CLT, supra note 4, at 379. 
33 Id. at 380. 
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reason [are] the true sources of law.”34  According to Aquinas, law 
is “an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him 
who has care of the community.”35 
The Aquinas excerpts in CLT demonstrate his integrated, 
rational approach.  The purpose of human law for Aquinas is to 
make people virtuous, at least gradually, by making them less 
vicious.36  People are capable of virtue, but those predisposed to 
evil can only be made better by coercive law.  Even custom can be 
treated as law.37  While human law could not and should not 
replicate all of higher law, human law is derived from natural 
law: “[A] thing is said to be just, from being right, according to 
the rule of reason.  But the first rule of reason is the law of 
nature . . . .  [So law] is derived from the law of nature. . . .  [I]f in 
any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law 
but a perversion of law.”38  Contemporary Catholic teaching 
continues to hold that a law that is “at variance with reason” is 
unjust and “is an act of violence.”39  Natural law theorists note 
that many kinds of human law can be considered reasonable in 
general, but that only by specific and prudent elaboration by 
judges and legislators can we know if a law comports with this 
standard.40  Obviously, Thomas’ teachings are interconnected in 
many ways.  CLT provides complementary materials.  For 
instance, it explores the relationship between law and culture—
law leads a person to virtue, culture leads a person to the natural 
common good.41 
The Thomistic view of law’s moral purpose is named legal 
moralism.  Aquinas gave the Church a worldview of harmony in 
which conflict over the substantive definition and application of 
 
34 Id. at 493 (quoting BENEDICT XVI, APOSTOLIC JOURNEY TO GERMANY 
ADDRESS AT BUNDESTAG (Sept. 22, 2011)). 
35 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. I-II, Q. 90.4, as reprinted in 
CLT, supra note 4, at 385. 
36 CLT, supra note 4, at 429. 
37 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. I-II, Q. 97.3, as reprinted in 
CLT, supra note 4, at 191. 
38 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. I-II, Q. 95.2, as reprinted in 
CLT, supra note 4, at 435. 
39 JOHN XXIII, PACEM IN TERRIS, ¶ 51 (1963), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, 
at 80, 84. 
40 See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (2d ed. 2011), as 
reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 436–37; RÉMI BRAGUE, THE LAW OF GOD: THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY OF AN IDEA (2008), quoted in CLT, supra note 4, at 437. 
41 CLT, supra note 4, at 182. 
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virtue is absent.  CLT provides examples of both contemporary 
proponents and critics of the moral purpose of law.  Pope 
Benedict XVI noted “the harmony of objective and subjective 
reason,”42 while Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr 
observed that Aquinas’ natural law—as the part of the eternal or 
divine law manifested in a “universal” human reason—obscured 
historical variation in reason and made a pretentious claim to 
certainty on moral issues.43  It is good to hear many Christian 
voices weighing in on these matters. 
For Aquinas, all of human law had to comport with universal 
reason in accordance with Christian moral teaching.  This unity 
again emphasizes a harmonious sense of law and political 
authority rather than a conflicted or adversarial system (even 
while great church-state power struggles are under way).  As 
Berman noted in the language quoted above, both ecclesiastical 
and state authorities had to recognize the separate jurisdictions 
of each but also had to recognize the supremacy of the rule of law 
over both.  The Church obviously had much to say about what 
was moral, and thus to judge whether law was a perversion or a 
proper way toward virtue. 
Church teaching on political authority envisioned the unity 
of law under a comprehensive moral vision.  The state was 
viewed as a “perfect society” with “supreme power” subject to the 
natural limits of other spheres, like family and Church—the 
latter being considered a perfect society as well, with the pope 
having supreme power in the religious realm.44  Reinforcing this 
sense of unity was a theological, as opposed to natural law, 
doctrine, the Kingship of Christ, in which Christ as King has 
supreme authority over all of government and society.45  His 
Kingship was consistent with the separate jurisdictions of church 
and state, since their responsibilities differ (mirroring Christ’s 
priestly and royal roles); His Church has genuine ruling 
authority “on at least a par with that exercised by the state.”46  
 
42 BENEDICT XVI, APOSTOLIC JOURNEY TO GERMANY ADDRESS AT BUNDESTAG 
(Sept. 22, 2011), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 493. 
43 REINHOLD NIEBUHR, 2 THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN 252–53 (1943), as 
reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 410–11. 
44 HEINRICH ROMMEN, THE STATE IN CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 397–98, 400–
01 (1947), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 478–79. 
45 PIUS XI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER QUAS PRIMAS (1925), as reprinted in CLT, supra 
note 4, at 484. 
46 CLT, supra note 4, at 475. 
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CLT offers a fascinating description of Christendom and the 
Kingship of Christ, noting its expression as late as 1925 in the 
encyclical Quas Primas.47 
In Quas Primas, the fact that Christ is a law-giver means 
that secular leaders are invested with religious significance and 
should be obeyed.48  The document assumes benevolent rulers 
who understand when “they rule, not by their own right, but by 
the mandate and in the place of the Divine King, they will 
exercise their authority piously and wisely” in accord with 
“common good” and “human dignity.”49  Indeed, to the critical eye 
of Catholic intellectual Jacques Maritain, such thinking reflected 
a long history that justified “absolute sovereignty on the basis of 
a theological myth, the divine right of kings” and on the notion of 
“ ‘substantialism’—the ‘myth that the state is the people 
personified.’ ”50 
The dangers of sacralizing existing political authority are 
immediately apparent, which may explain why the Kingship of 
Christ has fallen out of use in Catholic social thought.  But CLT 
shows the power of the concept when it is used to condemn, 
rather than support, existing authority.  Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
used the Kingship of Christ in a prophetic way to criticize the 
Nazi regime and to remind the Lutheran Church that the 
church’s role is to “bring[] government to an understanding of 
itself.”51  Given the state’s divine origin, it must obey Jesus.52  By 
this, Bonhoeffer does not mean that government is supposed to 
enact Christian law and policy.  Rather, government is to be a 
“true government in accordance with its own special task[s].”53  
The Church claims institutional protection for itself and its  
 
 
47 See generally QUAS PRIMAS, supra note 45, as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, 
at 484–85. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 485. 
50 Russell Hittinger, Reasons for a Civil Society, in REASSESSING THE LIBERAL 
STATE 11, 23 (Timothy Fuller & John P. Hittinger eds., 2001), as reprinted in CLT, 
supra note 4, at 487 (reviewing Maritain’s Man and the State). 
51 DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, ETHICS 342 (1955), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 
4, at 482, 483. 
52 See id. 
53 Id. 
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proclamation, and for Christians to live in obedience to Jesus.54  
Bonhoeffer says government cannot be grounded in natural 
law—only in Christ.55 
III. THE MODERN ERA: THE DESACRALIZED STATE IN CHRISTIAN 
LEGAL THOUGHT 
In contrast to the traditional Catholic doctrine of 
sovereignty, in the last century and a half, “Catholic thought has 
been liberated from any temptation to sacralize or substantialize 
the state” that the traditional doctrine had implied.56  Catholic 
intellectuals Jacques Maritain and John Courtney Murray, S.J., 
who were influenced profoundly by the U.S. Constitution, 
developed an “instrumentalist concept” of the state, with law 
serving rights and liberties of various social groups that together 
cannot be equated with the state.57  This transition to the 
instrumental state is a dramatic and difficult one for the Catholic 
tradition.  As is seen above in Part II, the tradition’s 
anthropological, social, political, and legal concepts create a fully 
harmonious vision of the person, the society, the state, and the 
legal system, each sharing compatible moral standards and 
purposes.  Modern Church social teachings do not abandon this 
harmony; but now the teachings must engage a new reality in 
which church and state no longer share the norms of a common 
culture.  We see the recognition of this new reality with 
particular intensity in the documents of the Second Vatican 
Council, 1962–1965, and in some of the current ambivalence 
toward the secular state voiced in litigation and lobbying 
positions. 
In my view, six relevant themes emerge from the wealth of 
materials in CLT to help us explore the notion of the 
instrumental state and the non-establishment norms that define 
some of the limits to its political and legal authority.  First, there 
is the theme of subsidiarity.  In addition to legal theory, 
Christians have developed related social theories.  No longer 
fixated exclusively on the relationship between ecclesiastical and 
governmental bodies, they have begun to think more broadly 
about limiting political authority to allow human persons and 
 
54 See id. at 482–83. 
55 See id. 
56 Hittinger, supra note 50, at 488. 
57 Id. at 487–88. 
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social groups in society to flourish.  Second, there is the theme of 
constitutional government.  As the brutality of secular, 
totalitarian governments became more intense, Christian 
intellectuals have come to emphasize constitutionally-guaranteed 
rights.  The earlier expectation of a benevolent, divinely-ordained 
ruler who promulgated moral laws has ceased to be a motivating 
vision.  Third, there is the theme of human rights.  The leading 
proponents of the movement to define universal human rights in 
the post-war period were Christians steeped in the rich 
intellectual tradition of the faith that recognized inherent limits 
on governmental authority.  Fourth, there is the theme of the 
limits of legal moralism.  The Thomistic notion of the moral 
purposes of law has come under scrutiny, especially by 
Protestant Christians, and a reconsideration in the context of 
pluralism has begun.  Fifth, there is the theme of pluralism.  The 
rise of a pluralistic, secular culture has made Christians think 
more deliberately about the proper relationship between law and 
culture, and the state’s role in that relationship.  Finally, there is 
the theme of justice for the poor.  The Christian obligation to love 
and care for the poor, the stranger, the widow, and the orphan 
has placed modern Christians at the center of many 
controversies over social and economic justice, which both limits 
and makes demands on the instrumental state.  These six 
threads receive extensive treatment in CLT and can help create a 
framework for piecing together an approach to Christian norms 
of non-establishment. 
A. Subsidiarity 
CLT provides excellent materials to describe the concept of 
subsidiarity.  Both Catholics and Protestants developed social 
theories that limit government.  Abraham Kuyper, a Calvinist 
intellectual writing at the turn of the 20th century, developed a 
theory of “sphere sovereignty.”58  Catholic social thought, 
beginning at the end of the 19th century, developed a theory of 
“subsidiarity.”59  Both theories protect the individual and those 
groups that are not derived from the state: the family, church, 
business, unions, the arts, science, professional and civic groups, 
 
58 See generally Abraham Kuyper, Calvinism and Politics, in LECTURES ON 
CALVANISM (1931), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 320–34. 
59 MICHAEL GERSON, HEROIC CONSERVATISM (2008), as reprinted in CLT, supra 
note 4, at 77, 78. 
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charitable groups, and even the international community.60  The 
overarching principle is that these groups are ordered toward the 
common good.61  Higher authorities should not usurp the roles of 
lower groups unless necessary to address deficiencies in carrying 
out those roles; resources from higher authorities can be provided 
to enable lower groups to do what they do best.62  Gerson’s piece 
on subsidiarity is especially interesting, noting that the doctrine 
is consistent with American philosophy: “The founders were well 
aware of the central paradox of democracy: the strength of liberal 
political institutions—institutions characterized by autonomy 
and free choice—depend on the health of illiberal social 
institutions—communities that teach moral rules and 
obedience.”63  The instrumental state is limited in its ability to 
control those social institutions. 
B. Constitutional Government 
Christian thinkers like Maritain and Murray were convinced 
that there needed to be constitutional guarantees in order to 
protect individuals, churches, and other groups.  Murray was the 
primary drafter of Dignitatis Humanae, a document of the 
Second Vatican Council, which grounded the right to religious 
freedom in the dignity of the human person.64  The document was 
a clear recognition of the need for constitutional guarantees of 
the free exercise of religion by all persons and religious 
institutions, without regard to the truth of the beliefs and 
practices.  The instrumental nature of the state leaves quite a bit 
of room open for the leavening of moral and spiritual values.  
Pope John Paul II, in Centesimus Annus, wrote that “[a]uthentic 
democracy is possible only in a State ruled by law, and on the 
basis of a correct conception of the human person.”65  Yet because 
 
60 See HEINRICH ROMMEN, THE STATE IN CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT (1947), as 
reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 479. 
61 See Michael P. Moreland, The Pre-History of Subsidiarity in Leo XIII in this 
volume, at 63. See also Elizabeth F. DeFeis, Religious Liberty and Protections in 
Europe, 45 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 73 (2006) (noting influence of Catholic 
subsidiarity). 
62 See PIUS XI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER QUADRAGESIMO ANNO ¶ 80 (1931), as 
reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 480. 
63 GERSON, supra note 59, at 78. 
64 See SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY DIGNITATIS HUMANAE ¶ 2 (1965), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 475. 
65 Russell Hittinger, Introduction to THE TEACHINGS OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY 
ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE (John Witte Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 
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there is no such consensus on a correct conception, Maritain and 
Murray say this must be achieved “indirectly, through 
evangelization and education of society itself [rather than 
through exercises of jurisdiction, either direct or indirect, of an 
established Church].”66 
The recognition of a secular, instrumental state is part of the 
teaching, despite the fact that some of the language in Dignitatis 
Humanae signals a limited acceptance of legal and cultural 
establishment.67  The issue of a “Catholic establishment” has to 
be placed in the context of the larger debate within Catholicism 
as to whether the modern documents, including those of the 
Second Vatican Council, represent a rejection of prior teaching, 
or whether they maintain continuity with prior teaching.  Of 
course, there is much continuity:  Pope John XXIII in Pacem in 
Terris makes clear that the purpose of political authority is to 
attain the common good;68 government authority is a natural part 
of the moral order and derives from God;69 and laws that 
contravene the moral order are not binding.70  The debate 
surrounding discontinuity and continuity is quite nuanced,71 but 
it is significant because it gets to the core question of the extent 
of religious freedom urged by Dignitatis Humanae.  At the time 
of the Council, it was certainly clear that the Church had rejected  
 
 
2006), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 491 (quoting JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL 
LETTER CENTESIMUS ANNUS (1991)). 
66 Id. (alteration in original). 
67 Dignitatis Humanae accepts establishments that exist under unique 
historical circumstances. DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, ¶ 6, supra note 64, as reprinted in 
CLT, supra note 4, at 490. It further retains “freedom of the Church” language, 
asserting the Church’s freedom “as a spiritual authority established by Christ the 
Lord, upon which there rests, by divine mandate, the duty of going out into the 
whole world and preaching the Gospel to every creature. The Church also claims 
freedom for herself in her character as a society of men who have the right to live in 
society in accordance with the precepts of the Christian faith.” Id. ¶ 13. 
68 See JOHN XXIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER PACEM IN TERRIS ¶ 54 (1963), as 
reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 80, 85. 
69 See id. ¶ 46. 
70 See id. ¶ 51. But the teaching saw a new emphasis on the people’s ability to 
choose their rulers and type of government, as well as the emphasis on multi-branch 
government. Id. ¶ 52. 
71 See, e.g., Joseph A. Komonchak, Novelty in Continuity: Pope Benedict’s 
Interpretation of Vatican II, AMERICA (Feb. 2, 2009), 
https://www.americamagazine.org/issue/684/article/novelty-continuity. 
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its previous teaching that “error has no rights.”  Yet CLT points 
to the ambiguity regarding the acceptance and definition of 
establishment.72 
C. Human Rights 
The Catholic acknowledgement that rights must be 
constitutionally guaranteed is not limited to religious exercise, 
nor to the domestic realm.  There is an entire body of civil, 
political, social, and economic rights, and they are universal.  The 
Catholic intellectual contribution to the human rights discourse, 
ultimately embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, was substantial.73  Jacques Maritain, a major contributor 
to its drafting, noted its traditional roots:  “How could we 
understand human rights if we had not a sufficiently adequate 
notion of natural law? The same natural law which lays down our 
most fundamental duties . . . is the very law which assigns to us 
our fundamental rights.”74  Despite criticism from Protestant 
intellectuals like Reinhold Niebuhr, who thought the natural law 
was a “dead end” without “the enlightenment, strength and 
perfection of Divine Law,”75 the language of universal human 
rights and the institutionalization of the commitment to human 
rights (in governments and non-governmental organizations 
worldwide) is undoubtedly a major contribution of Christian legal 
thought.76  Human rights abuses that involve established 
religions can help identify those limits to religious freedom that 
thwart the common good. 
 
72 CLT, supra note 4, at 490. For the view that Dignitatis Humanae did not 
change the traditional teaching on church-state relations, see Patrick McKinley 
Brennan, The Liberty of the Church: Source, Scope, and Scandal, 21 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 165, 170–74 (2013). 
73 CLT, supra note 4, at 462–63. 
74 JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE (1951), as reprinted in CLT, supra 
note 4, at 457. 
75 CLT, supra note 4, at 449 (quoting Brian McCall, Consulting the Architect 
When Problems Arise—The Divine Law, 9 GEO. J. L. PUB. POL’Y 103, 117, 129 (2010). 
76 See, e.g., C.M.A. McCauliff, Cognition and Consensus in the Natural Law 
Tradition and Neuroscience: Jacques Maritain and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, 54 VILL. L. REV. 435, 461–77 (2009); C.M.A. McCauliff, Union in 
Europe: Constitutional Philosophy and the Schuman Declaration, May 9, 1950, 18 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 441, 460–72 (2012). 
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D. Limits to Legal Moralism 
The Thomistic notion that law can make persons better, 
more virtuous, has come under intense scrutiny from Protestant 
Christians, and the debates are nicely presented in CLT.  
Niebuhr spoke of the law of love, which would replace rigid moral 
norms: 
[T]he law, however conceived, accepts and regulates self-
interest and prohibits only the most excessive forms of it. It 
does not command that we love the neighbor but only that we 
not take his life or property. It does not command that we seek 
our neighbor’s good but that we respect his rights. Broadly 
speaking, the end of the law is justice. But we have already seen 
that justice is related to love. . . . The law seeks for a tolerable 
harmony of life with life, sin presupposed. It is, therefore, an 
approximation of the law of love on the one hand and an 
instrument of love on the other hand. . . . [D]istinction between 
law and love is less absolute and more dialectical than 
conceived in either Catholic or Reformation thought. . . . [Those 
two] are too certain about the fixities of the norms of law. All 
law . . . is more tentative and less independent of its authority 
[than these suppose].77 
Christian legal scholars David Skeel and the late Bill Stuntz 
argue that since law cannot save souls, legal moralism is “nearly 
always counterproductive” and “deeply wrong.”78  They point to 
great social dangers of trying to equate the immoral with the 
illegal as well as the dangers to faith communities.79  When faith 
is made into a moral code, Christians focus on obeying rules and 
not on moral discernment, and churches become pharisaical.80  
Others challenge the Thomistic emphasis on the moral purposes 
of law by noting that “[a]s a coercive force, law cannot effect 
change from the inside.  Standing alone, it cannot change the 
internal dispositions and attitudes of the human person.”81  
 
77 REINHOLD NIEBUHR, CHRISTIAN REALISM AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS (1953), 
as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 444. Note also that Wolterstorff and Barth 
would say that if the church understands its own nature, it would not say 
government has the authority to do what Aquinas (and Calvin) say it should do. 
CLT, supra note 4, at 486. 
78 David Skeel & William Stuntz, Christianity and the Modest Rule of Law, 8 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 809, 838 (2006), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 433. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. at 432–33. 
81 John M. Breen, John Paul II, The Structures of Sin and the Limits of Law, 52 
ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 317 (2008), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 94. 
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Gregory Kalscheur, S.J. argues that Catholic teaching itself—in 
Dignitatis Humanae—“limits the moral aspirations of the law” in 
connection with morals legislation.82  On the other hand, by 
breaking out of the narrow focus on sexuality, which has 
consumed so much Christian thinking on legal moralism, we 
might be able to see that what we think of as rights-based law 
can be reframed as an updated version of legal moralism.  For 
instance, laws governing how employers and employees treat one 
another in terms of sexuality or race are usually cast as 
prohibitions on discrimination.  Yet many committed to a secular 
state would agree that the law teaches people how to treat one 
another with dignity and respect, which indeed seems designed 
(if not in purpose, then in effect) to make people more virtuous. 
E. Pluralism 
Christendom has ended.  But culture continues, and 
obviously continues to be influenced by Christianity.  Humans 
are “world-makers” through their art, music, literature, 
commerce, law, relationships, and sovereign and subsidiary 
institutions,83 and culture is normative way of “being.”84  Culture 
is “made manifest in speech, laws, and routine practices of some 
self-monitoring and self-perpetuating group.”85  It has become 
necessary to explore the link between culture and law, and CLT 
notes a variety of Christian thought on the matter, with some 
arguing that law leads persons “to the natural common good” and 
others arguing that “[l]aws cannot generate values, or instill 
values, or settle the conflict over values.”86  Obviously, culture 
that is religiously pluralistic and secular poses a challenge for 
Christians, potentially creating an emphasis on a church’s own 
rights rather than on its contribution to culture.  But the 
materials in CLT invite consideration of what a pluralistic 
 
82 CLT, supra note 4, at 445 (emphasis in original) (citing Gregory Kalscheur, 
S.J., Moral Limits on Morals Legislation: Lessons for U.S. Constitutional Law from 
the Declaration on Religious Freedom, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (2006)). 
83 JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, TO CHANGE THE WORLD 3–4 (2010), as reprinted in 
CLT, supra note 4, at 179. 
84 JOHN PAUL II, ADDRESS TO UNESCO (June 2, 1980), as reprinted in CLT, 
supra note 4, at 180–81. 
85 RICHARD SHWEDER, WHY DO MEN BARBECUE? RECIPES FOR CULTURAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 11 (2003), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 179. 
86 CLT, supra note 4, at 182 (quoting Patrick McKinley Brennan and James 
Davison Hunter, respectively). 
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culture means to a tradition that has known many ways of living 
in culture: as a suffering minority group, as a free and self-
governing group among multiple cultures, and as the group with 
authority over all.  The materials on the five main strands of 
Christianity—Catholic, Lutheran, Anabaptist, Calvinist, and 
Reformed—are particularly rich resources. 
F. Justice for the Poor 
The final modern theme gleaned from CLT in an exploration 
of non-establishment norms of a secular state is the commitment 
to social and economic justice for the poor.  Of course, this 
commitment is not new, but its urgency has grown as suffering 
has increased.  The Gerson excerpts emphasize Catholic thinking 
about solidarity with the vulnerable and oppressed,87 and Keller 
writes of the radical nature of the concern for the poor as a 
political concept in both Judaism and Christianity.88  The concern 
is also connected deeply to the ancient commitment to the 
common good.  But the common good is a problematic concept for 
the liberal state, since most governments rely on a utilitarian-
welfare rationale like the public or national interest.89  Alasdair 
MacIntyre also speaks of how impossible it is for governments to 
conceptualize the common good when their distribution of goods 
is based on power and wealth.90  Despite these discouragements, 
Christians have continued to work tirelessly for the improvement 
of the lives of others, and their constant service and advocacy is 
perhaps the greatest Christian contribution to political thought.91  
Even the work of political theorist John Rawls has been 
influenced by the Christian outreach to the vulnerable: given the 
unfair distribution of benefits and burdens, he built his theory of 
justice on a conception that does not permit rulemaking from the 
vantage point of privilege.92  The instrumental state simply 
cannot be conceptualized without taking into account both the 
economic successes and the economic inequities of its citizens. 
 
87 See GERSON, supra note 59, at 79. 
88 See TIMOTHY KELLER, GENEROUS JUSTICE: HOW GOD’S GRACE MAKES US 
JUST (2010), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 364. 
89 CLT, supra note 4, at 492. 
90 See id. at 489. 
91 See GERSON, supra note 59, at 79. 
92 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, 
at 376. 
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IV. A FRESH LOOK AT THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
I now return to the observations set out at the start of this 
paper.  Catholic and Evangelical Protestant institutions have 
very little use for the Establishment Clause when it is not 
playing a role that is redundant to the Free Exercise Clause.  In 
other words, these religious communities see little need for 
setting “outer bounds” of religious freedom—at least not by way 
of non-establishment norms.  They accept in general the “public 
order” limits to religious freedom, but the task of defining those 
limits in particular circumstances is always a challenge.  Indeed, 
those public order limits may overlap with non-establishment 
limits.  My inquiry is this: whether Christian legal thought 
compels, or at least supports, an interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause marked by a lack of concern for non-
establishment norms that place boundaries on religious exercise.  
In my reading of CLT, I have found ample material to enlighten 
our understanding of Christian perspectives on notions of 
“establishment” and to provide a six-point framework for further 
exploration.  Christian legal thought is not uniform; and given 
the significant threads that critique and moderate Christian 
claims to political and legal authority, Christians can claim no 
single interpretation of the Establishment Clause.  Yet there 
remains a powerful strand of Christian thought that is 
committed to the witness of the church alone, radically separate 
from the state.  Catholic institutions remain wedded to an 
accommodationist approach to the clause because it is most 
consistent with the harmonious vision of church-state 
cooperation visible in its social teachings.  But this harmonious 
vision is an obstacle to thinking comprehensively about non-
establishment norms.  The Establishment Clause is not premised 
on harmony but on conflict.  The worry is not only that the state 
could manipulate and destroy the church, but that a church could 
gain civil power over the state and its citizens. 
Christian legal thought has a complicated relationship to the 
secular, liberal state.  Catholic teaching is that the state is 
properly secular.  Indeed, the current Catholic teaching is for the 
constitutional guarantee of religious liberty,93 along with other 
civil, political, social, and economic rights.  Yet traditionalists 
appear to voice great nostalgia for Christendom, when the 
 
93 CLT, supra note 4, at 489–90. 
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Kingship of Christ over all political authority was taught.  
Indeed, Oliver O’Donovan points to the Religion Clauses as “the 
symbolic end of Christendom,”94 and laments the fact that the 
very notion of government and society being under Christ’s rule 
is nearly impossible to conceive of once the liberal state and 
religious pluralism are accepted.95  Christendom has ended: the 
state does not have to obey Christ and cannot privilege and 
financially support the Church’s mission; further, the Christian 
definition of the “moral” good of the state and society no longer 
governs, leading to what he calls a “demoralized conception of 
society.”96 
But the secular, liberal state is what we have, and it cannot 
choose a religion for itself.  This is the most basic of non-
establishment norms.  In a pluralistic society marked by religious 
equality and constitutionally guaranteed protections for religious 
freedom, government protects the religious exercise of all.  Under 
these conditions, government has no capacity to give religious 
preference.  Maritain believed that establishment violated 
human equality.97  Indeed, the accommodationist narrative 
offered by Catholics during the mid-20th century to justify aid to 
parochial schools, described in Part I above, was grounded in the 
concept of “non-preferentialism”—aid given to religious groups 
evenhandedly.  Churches in litigation argue for accommodation, 
not for “denominational preference.”  All have accepted the 
notion of equal treatment. 
CLT raises some very provocative questions that challenge 
the liberalism of the state:  What would it look like if the 
magisterium returned to the 1925 Quas Primas and again called 
for the Kingship of Christ for part of its social teaching, “to 
regard their elected officials as viceregents of Christ the king?”98  
Imagine the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops describing 
Jesus as King over American society, with elected officials His 
earthly agents.  What kind of political discourse would result 
from such a claim?  Would it prompt government officials to 
consider the common good beyond local or national self-interest?  
How might this change our law-making?  The Lemon test, though 
 
94 O’DONOVAN, supra note 12, as reprinted in CLT, supra note 4, at 471. 
95 See id. 
96 Id. at 472. 
97 See CLT, supra note 4, at 490. 
98 Id. at 485. 
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much reviled, states a long-standing principle of political 
liberalism: law must have a secular purpose.  Would recognizing 
the Kingship of Christ allow lawmakers to enact “Christian” 
laws?  What would they look like?  Would they have secular 
purposes?  Would these laws be different from the Thomistic laws 
with “moral” purposes?  Presumably, laws with moral purposes 
can be articulated in non-religious terms.  But would the 
Kingship of Christ prompt something different?  Would it be 
more like a situation in which legislators enacted sharia law?  Or 
is Christian lawmaking saved by the fact that law is not 
“revealed” but comes from “nature and reason”? 
In addition to elected officials, CLT also raises the possibility 
of judges explicitly doing God’s will.  CLT authors asked: 
Does the historical shift away from a Christian worldview in 
which divine law is always already present and widely 
acknowledged, to a worldview in which what power there is 
above human law is “from the people,” undermine Christian 
(and other) arguments in favor of a judicial power to answer to 
the divine law directly?”99 
Using the example of a court that permits a suit for wrongful 
death of a fetus when the state law did not provide for such a 
cause of action, CLT asks whether courts can give legal, that is, 
coercive effect “to obligations grounded in divine law, natural or 
revealed.”100  Yet courts often find duties in equity that are not 
based in text or precedent, but instead reason from analogy, 
inference, and ethical principles of justice.  Is it necessary for a 
court to claim that it is doing God’s will?  How can such a claim 
be measured or tested? 
I found these examples startling, because they ask us to 
consider situations that step beyond those outer bounds to 
religious freedom that I had supposed were set by the non-
establishment norms.  Of course, any church can frame in its own 
religious terms the way it thinks about elected officials and the 
way judges ought to rule.  But for the public actors themselves, 
we typically think about shared rules of engagement and the 
norms set for those groups: elected officials and judges owe duties 
to the Constitution; the stability of law and political-legal 
institutions is an important value among other values; judges are 
 
99 Id. at 449. 
100 Id. at 428 (emphasis in original). 
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held to particular standards of impartiality.  Moreover, and 
perhaps most importantly, there is already tremendous latitude 
in politics and law to “do” natural law because, as John Courtney 
Murray noted, we all are natural lawyers.101  Must politicians 
and judges make the claim that they are legislating and 
adjudicating based on divine and natural law?  How are such 
claims possible in a religiously plural society with secular rules of 
engagement? 
CLT thus raises some central questions about the interplay 
of Christian legal thought and the liberal state and highlights 
concepts that both shape and detract from law in that politically 
and religiously pluralistic context.  In particular, CLT describes 
the modern experience, noted above in Part III, which helps 
mediate the theological concepts and commitments that can set 
limits to (and define obligations of) the instrumental state: 
subsidiarity, constitutional government, universal human rights, 
limited legal moralism, pluralism, and justice for the poor.  There 
is a recognition that “creation, providence, the Fall, redemption, 
the divine law, natural law and much more” are no longer part of 
current jurisprudence, so that Christian legal thought influences 
lawmaking in “subtle and unexpected ways.”102  I note, for 
instance, that Kuyperian sphere sovereignty and Catholic social 
thought on subsidiarity influenced the Bush administration 
(2001–2009) in the design of its “faith-based initiatives” program 
to fund religious social services at the local level.103  Christian 
concepts like these, which provide a coherent moral vision and 
make political sense in the instrumental state, can help not only 
to conceptualize “the common good” but actually contribute to it 
as well.  This Christian influence by way of leavening the 
political and legal culture may turn out to be a significant 
contribution in the modern period. 
In addition to the six themes I identified for exploring 
Christian understandings of non-establishment norms, I would 
add yet another category: the recognition of the dialogue between 
notions of power and powerlessness, so central to Christian 
theology and yet largely unexplored in Christian political and 
legal thought.  In connection with interpretations of the 
 
101 Murray, supra note 15, at 54. 
102 CLT, supra note 4, at 426–27. 
103 Lew Daly, European Dream: The Political Theology of George W. Bush’s 
Faith-Based Initiative, 115 THEORIA: J. SOC. AND POL. THEORY 32, 33 (2008). 
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Establishment Clause, I noted at the outset that the case law 
tends to fall in the area of government messages and government 
money.  The pietistic separationists, coming out of the 
Anabaptist tradition (the soul-liberty Baptists of the founding 
era), wanted nothing from government except freedom.  But 
Catholics and Evangelical Protestants are more likely to be 
concerned that a heavy-handed Establishment Clause “weaken[s] 
the Church’s place in society.”104  Perhaps it is because so much of 
the Christian tradition is immersed in questions of political and 
legal power and authority—as is thoroughly documented in 
CLT—that Christians worry about their “place” in society if they 
do not have political and legal affirmation.  But the 
Establishment Clause disempowers in particular ways all 
religious groups in connection with state political authority and 
law-making authority.105  Christian notions of powerlessness can 
be found in abundance in the Anabaptist tradition, but also 
within the Catholic monastic and contemplative traditions.  
Despite the wealth of contemplative thought and liturgical 
practice that revolves around the notion of Jesus’ “power through 
powerlessness,” there seems to be little, if any, attention paid to 
its possible civic-political meaning.  Perhaps a retrieval of these 
sources on power and powerlessness and some reframing of the 
questions will also assist with the exploration of what 
Christianity has to say about non-establishment norms and, per 
Niebuhr, the law of love.106 
 
104 CLT, supra note 4, at 490. 
105 See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696 
(1994); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126–27 (1982). 
106 See Niebuhr, supra note 77, at 444 and accompanying text. See also AGAPE, 
JUSTICE, AND LAW: HOW MIGHT CHRISTIAN LOVE SHAPE LAW? (eds. Robert F. 
Cochran, Jr., and Zachary Calo) (2017). 
